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PUTTING INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 
INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME: CAN EUROPE DO IT 
FLYING SOLO? 
Daniel B. Reagan* 
Abstract: In December 2006, the European Commission announced a 
proposal for a directive that would bring international civil aviation within 
its Emissions Trading Scheme, the most ambitious international carbon 
dioxide emissions trading scheme to date, and the European Union’s 
primary means of meeting its Kyoto Protocol obligations. While aviation 
and environmental stakeholders throughout the world have showed 
strong support for the proposal, representatives of aviation interests in-
side, and especially outside, the European Union have reacted with skep-
ticism and concern. This Note discusses the international civil aviation 
regulatory framework and the mechanics of the proposed directive. It 
then explores the political, technical, and legal implications of the pro-
posed legislation and concludes that the European Commission should 
not include international aviation in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme, but rather should vigorously pursue multilateral inter-
national aviation emissions reductions through the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. 
Introduction 
 Aircraft release gaseous and particulate emissions at high altitudes 
directly into the atmosphere.1 These emissions likely contribute to cli-
mate change through altering the atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases—including carbon dioxide (CO2), ozone (O3), and 
methane (CH4)—forming condensation trails, and increasing cirrus 
cloudiness.2 Aircraft emissions account for approximately two percent 
                                                                                                                      
* Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2007–08. 
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Aviation and the Global Atmos-
phere: Summary for Policy Makers, at 3 (1999) [hereinafter IPCC Report, Aviation and the 
Global Atmosphere]. 
2 Id. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 
2007: The Physical Science Basis, Summary for Policy Makers (2007), available at 
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of global CO2 emissions.3 These emissions are projected to increase as 
the international civil aviation industry expands.4 
 Global concern over the climate change effects of greenhouse gas 
emissions, particularly CO2, continues to increase.5 Regulatory bodies 
are extending their reach to cover CO2 emissions.6 During the last two 
decades, concerned regulatory bodies have moved beyond traditional 
command-and-control regulation and have developed novel emissions 
regulation mechanisms, including market-based systems such as emis-
sions trading.7 The European Union (EU) has implemented its Emis-
sions Trading Scheme (ETS)—the most ambitious CO2 emissions trad-
ing scheme to date—as a primary means of meeting its Kyoto Protocol 
targeted CO2 emissions reductions.8 Phase I of the ETS began on Janu-
ary 1, 2005, and is limited to CO2 emissions from industrial installations 
in the energy, metal production, mineral, and paper industries in EU 
member-states.9 The EU is employing a phased implementation of the 
ETS, with successive iterations featuring tightened emissions targets 
and expanded coverage of new industries.10 
 On December 20, 2006, the European Commission (EC), the ex-
ecutive body of the EU, announced a proposal for a directive (Pro-
posed Directive) that would bring civil aviation within the ETS.11 The 
Proposed Directive would extend the ETS to cover flights within the EU 
in 2011 and all flights arriving in or departing from the EU in 2012.12 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg1.htm (providing an updated report on the effects 
of human activity on climate change). 
3 IPCC Report, Aviation and the Global Atmosphere, supra note 1, at 6. 
4 Id. 
5 Climate Change and Carbon Markets, at xxx (Farhana Yamin ed., 2005). 
6 See id.; Laurence Neville, Power Plays, Global Fin., Feb. 1, 2007, at 42 (noting the in-
creasing likelihood of carbon regulation in the U.S. energy industry). 
7 Jurgen Lefevere, The EU Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme, in Climate 
Change and Carbon Markets, supra note 5, at 81–82. 
8 Cong. Res. Service, Climate Change: The European Union’s Emissions Trading 
System (EU-ETS) 1 (2006), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/ 
2006/upl-meta-crs-9496/RL33581_2006Jul31.pdf [hereinafter CRS ETS Report]. 
9 European Comm’n, EU Action Against Climate Change, EU Emissions Trad-
ing—An Open Scheme Promoting Global Innovation to Combat Climate Change 7 
(2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/emission_trading3_en. 
pdf [hereinafter EC ETS Brochure]. 
10 Id. 
11 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowance Trading Within the Community, at 2, COM (2006) 818 final (Dec. 20, 2006), available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0818en01.pdf [here-
inafter Proposed Directive]. 
12 Id. at 6. 
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While aviation only accounts for a small portion of EU greenhouse gas 
emissions, the EC posits that failing to include aviation in the ETS 
would offset greater than twenty-five percent of its Kyoto CO2 emissions 
reductions.13 
 While aviation and environmental policy stakeholders throughout 
the world have showed strong support for the Proposed Directive, rep-
resentatives of aviation interests inside and outside the EU have reacted 
with skepticism and concern.14 Non-EU aviation interests critical of the 
Proposed Directive have focused their attention on the Directive’s ex-
tension of the ETS to flights originating outside of the EU or departing 
from an EU airport with a destination outside of the EU.15 These repre-
sentatives have raised political, technical, and legal critiques of the Pro-
posed Directive’s extension of the ETS to international aviation and 
have suggested that these concerns might ripen into legal action to 
block the implementation of the Directive.16 They argue that extending 
the ETS to international aviation is politically and technically suspect 
and in violation of the existing regulatory framework for international 
civil aviation, which is comprised of the International Convention on 
Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention or Convention), bilateral air ser-
vice agreements (ASAs) between states, and international law.17 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of international civil avia-
tion law. Part II describes the mechanics of the Proposed Directive and 
the EU rationale for including aviation within the ETS. Part III dis-
cusses the political, technical, and legal implications of the Proposed 
Directive’s extension of the ETS to international aviation. In light of 
the implications described in Part III, Part IV concludes that the EC 
                                                                                                                      
13 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Reducing the Climate Change 
Impact of Aviation, at 2, COM (2005) 459 final (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0459en01.pdf [hereinafter EC 
Communication on Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation]. 
14 See Mark Pilling & Jackie Thompson, Carbonstorm, Airline Business, Jan. 22, 2007, 
available at 2007 WLNR 2438040 (detailing the international response to the Proposed 
Directive, including the views of aviation representatives in the EU, United States, Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America). 
15 See Press Release, United States Mission to the European Union, U.S.’s Byerly Reaf-
firms Commitment to Finalizing Transatlantic Air Services Accord ( Jan. 11, 2007), 
http://useu.usmission.gov/Dossiers/Open_Skies/Jan1109_Byerly_Roundtable.asp [herein-
after U.S.-EU Mission Open Skies Press Release] (“The EU can do what it wants with its own 
carriers. That we don’t challenge. We, along with many other countries around the world 
simply object to the mandatory and unilateral inclusion of all carriers in the EU scheme.” 
(quoting John Byerly, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation Affairs)). 
16 See discussion infra Part III. 
17 See discussion infra Part III. 
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should not include international aviation in the ETS but rather should 
vigorously pursue multilateral international aviation emissions reduc-
tions through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
I. International Civil Aviation Law 
A. The Convention on International Civil Aviation 
 The Convention on International Civil Aviation is the legal frame-
work for modern international civil aviation.18 The Convention was a 
product of the International Civil Aviation Conference, held in Chi-
cago from November 1 to December 7, 1944.19 At the invitation of the 
U.S. government, representatives from fifty-two participating countries 
convened in Chicago to establish a legal structure for post-World War II 
international civil aviation.20 Since the Convention came into effect on 
April 4, 1947, more than 180 states, representing broad geographic and 
economic diversity, have become signatories.21 The stated purpose of 
the Convention is to ensure that international civil aviation develops in 
a safe and orderly manner based on the principles of equality of oppor-
tunity, as well as sound and economical operation of air transport ser-
vices.22 The rights, privileges, and restrictions of the signatory states are 
detailed in the ninety-six articles of the Convention.23 Technical inter-
national standards and recommended practices are described in the 
eighteen annexes to the Convention.24 
B. The ICAO 
 The Chicago Convention ICAO, a specialized agency of the United 
Nations, to enable the objectives of the convention and regulate inter-
national civil aviation.25 The primary objectives of the ICAO include: 
                                                                                                                      
18 R.I.R. Abeyratne, Legal and Regulatory Issues in International Aviation 9 
(1996). 
19 Thomas Buergenthal, Law-Making in the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization 4 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1969). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 3–4; Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Contracting States, http://www.icao.int/cgi/ 
goto_m.pl?cgi/statesDB4.pl?en (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
22 Convention on International Civil Aviation pmbl., Apr. 4, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. 
23 Buergenthal, supra note 19, at 4. 
24 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], The Convention on International Civil Aviation: An-
nexes 1 to 18, available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/anx/info/annexes_booklet_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Booklet on the Annexes to the Chicago Convention]. 
25 Buergenthal, supra note 19, at 4–5. 
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insuring the safe development of aviation throughout the world; meet-
ing the aviation needs of the world population; preventing economic 
waste due to unreasonable competition; and avoiding discrimination 
among member-states.26 The ICAO consists of an Assembly, a Council, 
and other subsidiary bodies.27 Each member-state has one vote in the 
Assembly, which is the sovereign body of the ICAO.28 The Assembly 
meets at least once every three years to review the work of the organiza-
tion, elect the Council, delegate matters to the Council or a subsidiary 
body, decide on agreements with other international actors, amend the 
Convention, and address any issue not specifically assigned to the 
Council.29 Measures put to a vote in the Assembly must pass by a simple 
majority.30 
 The governing body, the Council, is composed of thirty-six repre-
sentatives elected for three-year terms.31 Council membership is con-
trolled so that adequate representation is given to states of primary im-
portance in international civil aviation, states that otherwise would not 
be included who provide a large contribution to aviation facilities, and 
states not otherwise included whose inclusion ensures representation 
of each major geographic region of the world.32 The Convention vests 
in the Council legislative authority to draft and adopt international 
standards and recommended practices and to incorporate them in an-
nexes to the Convention.33 
C. ICAO Rulemaking and Guidance 
 ICAO guidance reaches nearly all matters relating to international 
civil aviation.34 Uniformity in aviation practices among member-states is 
an essential and consistent theme found throughout the Convention.35 
The ICAO favors stability and consensus in rulemaking to ease the 
                                                                                                                      
26 Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 44. 
27 Buergenthal, supra note 19, at 6. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.; Heather L. Miller, Civil Aircraft Emissions and International Treaty Law, 63 J. Air L. 
& Com. 697, 710 (1998). 
30 Buergenthal, supra note 19, at 6. 
31 Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Memorandum on ICAO, 
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/pub/memo.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum on the ICAO]. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Abeyratne, supra note 18, at 280. 
35 Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 37 (committing parties to work toward uni-
formity to “the highest degree practicable” in regulations, standards, and procedures af-
fecting aviation). 
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harmonization of national regulations with international standards and 
practices and to increase the likelihood of such harmonization.36 
1. Technical Matters 
 One of the Council’s primary functions is to draft and adopt in-
ternational standards and recommended practices to provide guidance 
on technical matters related to international aviation.37 The ICAO de-
fines standards as any specification that’s uniform application is recog-
nized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international air trans-
port and to which member-states will conform in accordance with the 
Convention.38 Recommended practices are defined as any specification 
that’s uniform application is recognized as desirable for the safety or 
regularity of international air transport and to which member-states will 
endeavor to conform in accordance with the Convention.39 
 After a two-thirds majority vote of the Council, standards and 
recommended practices become binding on all member-states who do 
not notify the Council of their objection within sixty days.40 The Con-
vention provides that when a member-state finds it cannot reasonably 
comply with a standard or practice, it notify the ICAO, which in turn 
will notify the remainder of the member-states.41 This enactment pro-
cedure is flexible by design and accounts for the divergent levels of 
economic development and power among the member-states.42 
2. Economic Matters 
 The ICAO has elaborated on the few Chicago Convention provi-
sions regarding economic rights and offered guidance to prevent the 
imposition of economic barriers to international aviation.43 Article 15 
of the Chicago Convention provides that aviation facilities and services 
                                                                                                                      
36 Abeyratne, supra note 18, at 15–17. 
37 Memorandum on the ICAO, supra note 31; see Booklet on the Annexes to the Chicago 
Convention, supra note 24. 
38 Abeyratne, supra note 18, at 16. 
39 Id. 
40 Miller, supra note 29, at 707. 
41 Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 38. 
42 Miller, supra note 29, at 728–29. 
43 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navi-
gation Services, at 3, ICAO Doc. 9082/7 (7th ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/9082/9082_7ed_en.pdf [hereinafter ICAO Policies on 
Charges]; Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], ICAO’s Policies on Taxation in the Field of Interna-
tional Air Transport, at 1, ICAO Doc. 8632-C/968 (2d ed. 1994), available at http://www. 
icao.int/icaonet/dcs/8632/8632_2ed_en.pdf [hereinafter ICAO Policies on Taxation]. 
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providers in signatory states may assess charges to recover their costs.44 
Article 15 further provides that no signatory state shall impose a charge 
based solely on right of transit, entry, or exit.45 Subsequent ICAO guid-
ance on Article 15 suggests that any charges assessed should be calcu-
lated to recover the cost of the facilities and services provided and 
should not exceed that amount.46 
 While the Chicago Convention itself does not deal extensively with 
taxes on international aviation, Article 24 exempts fuel and other sup-
plies arriving on board from a “customs duty” and other charges.47 Sub-
sequent ICAO guidance on taxation suggests that this exemption ap-
plies to “import, export, excise, sales, consumption and internal duties 
and taxes of all kinds levied upon the fuel.”48 Member-states typically 
negotiate taxation schemes in ASAs.49 Concerned with the proliferation 
of bilateral taxation between member-states, the ICAO has reiterated its 
firm support of the principle of nontaxation of international aviation.50 
3. Environmental Matters 
 The ICAO has demonstrated sustained responsiveness to envi-
ronmental concerns.51 Following the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment in 1972, the Assembly recognized in a reso-
lution that international aircraft operation may have an adverse envi-
ronmental impact.52 In 1983, the ICAO established the Committee on 
Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) to make recommenda-
tions regarding environmental issues relating to civil aviation to the 
Assembly and Council.53 The CAEP currently retains primary respon-
sibility for most of the ICAO’s environmental efforts.54 
 Annex 16 to the Convention, entitled Environmental Protection, 
details international aviation standards and recommended practices 
related to environmental quality.55 The first volume of the Annex ad-
                                                                                                                      
44 Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 15. 
45 Id. 
46 ICAO Policies on Charges, supra note 43, at 3, 12. 
47 See Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 24; Miller, supra note 29, at 712. 
48 ICAO Policies on Taxation, supra note 43, at 4. 
49 Miller, supra note 29, at 708. 
50 ICAO Policies on Taxation, supra note 43, at 1. 
51 Miller, supra note 29, at 712. 
52 Abeyratne, supra note 18, at 282. 
53 Id. at 287; Miller, supra note 29, at 714. 
54 Miller, supra note 29, at 714. 
55 Booklet on the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, supra note 24. 
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dresses aircraft noise and its impact on the human environment.56 The 
adverse effects of aircraft noise are of particular concern to member-
states in Europe, where airports tend to be located in areas with high 
population densities.57 The second volume of the Annex addresses en-
gine emissions and prescribes design specifications for the emission of 
smoke, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides.58 These 
technical standards acquire practical effect as engine manufacturers 
design and build engines to comply with the Annex 16 specifications.59 
 In 1998, the third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), at Kyoto, Ja-
pan, formalized the role of the ICAO in pursuing greenhouse gas emis-
sion reductions in international aviation.60 The Kyoto Protocol makes 
signatory states responsible for emissions from domestic aviation, as 
Article 2.2 provides that signatory states shall work through the ICAO 
in achieving international aviation greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
tions.61 At the ICAO’s request, the United Nation’s Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change prepared and published a report in 1999 that 
focused on aviation’s role in climate change.62 The ICAO has also con-
sulted the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological 
Advice on methods for collecting and reporting data on national 
greenhouse gas emissions.63 
 As environmental issues become increasingly entwined with eco-
nomic, technical, and international policy, the ICAO’s environmental 
efforts have expanded from setting technical standards on noise and 
emissions to considering market-based mechanisms to mitigate the ad-
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. 
57 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Flights of Fancy and Fights of Fury: Arbitration and Adjudication 
of Commercial and Political Disputes in International Aviation, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 231, 
278 (2004). 
58 Booklet on the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, supra note 24. 
59 Miller, supra note 29, at 714. 
60 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
art. 2.2, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
61 Id. (“The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emis-
sions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and ma-
rine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization, respectively.”). 
62 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies and 
Practices Related to Environmental Protection, Assemb. Res. A35-5 (2004), compiled in Assembly 
Resolutions in Force, at I-44, ICAO Doc. 9848 (Oct. 8, 2004) [hereinafter ICAO Assemb. Res. 
A35-5]. 
63 Id. 
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verse effects of aviation on the environment.64 In 2004, the Assembly 
issued a resolution summarizing ICAO guidance on market-based emis-
sions measures.65 The resolution focused on the voluntary emission re-
duction efforts of member-states, emissions-based taxes and charges, 
and emissions trading.66 The Assembly encouraged member-states to 
develop and implement voluntary emissions reduction measures and to 
report to the ICAO on the success of such measures.67 The Assembly 
encouraged adherence to its earlier guidance on the implementation 
of taxes and charges and counseled against the unilateral implementa-
tion of emissions levies.68 With respect to emissions trading, the Assem-
bly endorsed the further development of an international trading sys-
tem.69 The Assembly contemplated two possible emissions trading 
systems: (1) an international developed and administered system by the 
ICAO, or (2) ICAO oversight of the integration of international avia-
tion with pre-existing emissions trading regimes among member-states.70 
 The ICAO continues to work on developing guidance on an inter-
national aviation emissions trading regime.71 Following its meeting in 
February of 2007, the CAEP announced recommendations for the in-
clusion of international aviation emissions in ICAO member-state trad-
ing systems.72 The CAEP suggestions included: aircraft operators should 
be the regulated entity; operator obligations should be based on aggre-
gated emissions of covered flights; CO2 should initially be the only cov-
ered emission; and foreign operators should only be included on a mu-
tually agreed upon basis while member-states continue to consider 
further options.73 In May 2007, the ICAO hosted its second Colloquium 
on Aviation Emissions to elaborate on CAEP’s most recent work and to 
                                                                                                                      
64 Louise Maillett & Carl Burleson, Aviation and the Environment: Finding a Balance, 18 
Air & Space L. 4, 5 (2003). 
65 ICAO Assemb. Res. A35-5, supra note 62, at I-46. 
66 Id. at I-47 to I-48. 
67 Id. at I-47. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at I-48. 
70 Id. 
71 Press Release, Int’l Civil Aviation Org., ICAO Commits to Aggressive Action on Aircraft 
Emissions (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2007/pio200710_e. 
pdf [hereinafter ICAO 2007 Assembly Meeting Climate Change Group Press Release] (de-
scribing the creation of a new Group on International Aviation and Climate Change at the 
Assembly’s September 2007 meeting). 
72 Press Release, Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Participants of ICAO Environmental Meeting 
Agree on Guidance for Aviation Emissions Trading (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http:// 
www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?icao/en/nr/2007/pio200701_e.pdf (summarizing CAEP’s guid-
ance from its meeting in February 2007). 
73 Id. 
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inform the discussion of aviation mitigation measures among member-
states.74 At the Assembly meeting in September 2007, the ICAO agreed 
to create a new Group on International Aviation and Climate Change 
to facilitate the creation of an “implementation framework;” member-
states may use this framework to achieve emissions reductions through 
market-based measures, as well as technological advances, operational 
measures, and improvements in air traffic management.75 
D. Bilateral ASAs 
 An expansive network of bilateral ASAs between countries figures 
prominently in international aviation law.76 The Convention devotes 
little attention to the establishment of multilateral agreements on eco-
nomic rights.77 Under the general guidance of Article 6, which provides 
that no scheduled international air service may occur without prior au-
thorization, governments have negotiated economic rights through 
ASAs.78 The agreement negotiated between the United States and 
United Kingdon in 1946—exchanging air traffic rights—served as an 
early prototype for ASAs.79 In the years following, these ASAs prolifer-
ated between member-states, creating an extensive web of such agree-
ments.80 A modern bilateral agreement typically covers designation of 
carriers and routes, capacity, rates, discrimination and fair competition, 
security, and dispute resolution.81 
 There is a growing trend among member-states to negotiate multi-
lateral open skies agreements that commit a larger number of states to 
decrease government restrictions on air transport services.82 After years 
of negotiations, the United States and the EU, agreed upon the terms 
of a liberalized multilateral agreement to replace the web of ASAs be-
                                                                                                                      
74 Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Colloquium on Aviation Emissions with Exhibition Programme, 
available at http://www.icao.int/envclq/clq07/ClqProgramme.pdf (describing the ICAO 
colloquium planned for May 2007 to address international aviation emissions mitigation 
measures). 
75 ICAO 2007 Assembly Meeting Climate Change Group Press Release, supra note 71. 
76 Miller, supra note 29, at 707. 
77 Id. at 707–08. 
78 Id. at 708. 
79 Dempsey, supra note 57, at 238. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 239; see, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, Current Model Open Skies Agreement Text 
(Apr. 13, 2004), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/2008/19514.htm [hereinafter U.S. 
Model Open Skies ASA]. 
82 See Abeyratne, supra note 18, at 124. 
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tween the United States and individual EU member-states.83 The agree-
ment is designed to open the EU-U.S. market to greater competition to 
foster growth and lower fares.84 
E. Dispute Resolution 
 The frequent collision of commerce, culture, and politics figures 
prominently in international civil aviation.85 Accordingly, in this set-
ting disputes are to be anticipated.86 Parties to international aviation 
disputes have, for the most part, been able to resolve these disputes 
through negotiation.87 When negotiation fails, parties may seek reso-
lution through the provisions of ASAs between member-states, dispute 
mechanisms provided for by the Convention through the ICAO, or 
adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ).88 
 Modern ASAs typically provide means for dispute resolution be-
yond negotiation between the parties.89 U.S. ASAs, for instance, provide 
that the parties to a dispute arising under the agreement may engage in 
binding arbitration through an ad hoc tribunal if consultations be-
tween the parties fail.90 Recognizing the cost of arbitration, the ICAO 
has provided a model clause for ASAs.91 According to the model clause, 
the parties to an unresolved dispute agree to submit to mediation— 
presided over by a panel of experts selected from a registry maintained 
by the ICAO—and to be bound by the panel’s decision.92 Because 
countries are the signatories of ASAs, disputes nominally occur between 
signatory states.93 In practice, however, disputes may arise between air-
lines or an airline and a foreign airport or government.94 
 Article 84 of the Convention establishes a mechanism to resolve 
disputes between member-states over interpretation of the Convention 
or its annexes.95 Article 84 provides: “If any disagreement between two 
                                                                                                                      
83 Nicola Clark & Dan Bilefsky, Amid Complaints on Both Sides, Europeans Accept Open Skies 
Accord with U.S., N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2007, at C8. 
84 Id. 
85 Dempsey, supra note 57, at 233. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 234. 
88 Id. at 233. 
89 Id. at 240–41. 
90 U.S. Model Open Skies ASA, supra note 81, art. 14. 
91 Dempsey, supra note 57, at 243. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Chicago Convention, supra note 22, art. 84. 
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or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or application 
of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it 
shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, 
be decided by the Council.”96 No member of the Council may vote on 
any dispute to which it is a party, and either party may appeal the deci-
sion of the Council to an ad hoc tribunal or to the ICJ.97 Only five dis-
putes have been submitted to the Council for judicial resolution, and 
the Council has not decided any of these disputes on the merits.98 
 An environmental regulation dispute heard by the ICAO, between 
the United States and member-states of the E.U., elucidates the con-
tours of dispute resolution in the ICAO.99 Concerned about the effect 
of engine noise on highly populated areas surrounding airports, the 
EU adopted engine noise standards stricter than the noise specifica-
tions contained in Annex 16 to the Convention.100 Rather than pur-
chasing new aircraft, many airlines complied with the stricter standards 
by retrofitting aircraft engines with “hushkits” that dampened engine 
noise.101 EU member-states were not satisfied with this mode of compli-
ance, as the hushkitted older planes were not as quiet as the new air-
craft built to meet the stricter standards.102 In response, the EU re-
worked its noise regulations to reflect a certain parameter of engine 
performance rather than an absolute decibel level.103 
 Carriers who had invested in hushkitting older planes, rather than 
replacing them with newer aircraft, risked a severe loss under the new 
standard.104 Accordingly, the U.S. carrier Northwest Airlines, that’s fleet 
largely consisted of aging, hushkitted aircraft, filed a complaint with the 
U.S. Department of Transportation against the fifteen EU member-
states.105 The United States in turn filed a complaint under Article 84 of 
the Chicago Convention against the fifteen states on March 14, 2000.106 
Prior to this action, the Council had only heard disputes regarding air-
space restrictions.107 
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 The EU filed preliminary objections to the U.S. action, arguing 
that the action was premature because the parties had failed to engage 
in adequate negotiations, the United States failed to exhaust local 
remedies, and the scope of the relief requested exceeded the authority 
of the ICAO.108 Each party submitted a brief and gave oral arguments, 
and the Council in turn voted 26-0 in favor of the United States on the 
preliminary objections.109 The parties accepted the Council’s invitation 
in its decision to engage in negotiations to settle the dispute.110 Then 
president of the ICAO, Dr. Assad Kotaite, assisted the parties in their 
discussions.111 In October of 2001, the parties reached a preliminary 
agreement under which the United States would withdraw its ICAO 
complaint and the EU would repeal the engine parameter noise regu-
lation; the parties finally settled the dispute on December 6, 2003.112 
 This dispute highlights the institutional priorities of the ICAO dis-
pute resolution system.113 Had the Council reached a decision on the 
merits, it might have provided valuable guidance on the open question 
of whether ICAO environmental standards are the maximum which 
may be imposed by member-states or a minimum upon which member-
states may build.114 However, the Council’s preference to assist in a con-
sensual settlement rather than decide the dispute on the merits sug-
gests that the Council places a higher priority on ending disputes short 
of formal adjudication.115 
 Despite the ICJ’s contributions to international law, few states ac-
cede to the jurisdiction of the court.116 Of the twelve aviation disputes 
that have been brought before the ICJ, the court found it had jurisdic-
tion in only two cases and only once reached the merits of the case.117 
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II. The Proposed Directive 
A. The EU ETS 
 The proposal by the EC, the executive body of the EU, to include 
aviation within the EU ETS emerged from a sequence of events cata-
lyzed by the Kyoto Conference of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change.118 As signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, the 
EU and its member-states obligated themselves to make measurable 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions.119 EU environmental legislation 
has traditionally taken the form of command-and-control regulation.120 
Since the early 1990s though, there has been a growing interest in the 
EU in transitioning to market-based regulatory mechanisms, in large 
part due to the American experience with such regulation.121 Confi-
dence in emissions trading systems increased in the debate following 
Kyoto, as member states discussed low-cost means to attain the emis-
sions reductions mandated by the Protocol.122 
 The ETS is an essential element of EU climate change policy and a 
key mechanism through which the EU aims to meet its Kyoto obliga-
tions.123 Under the scheme, member-states allocate emissions allow-
ances to emitters covered by the ETS.124 Member-states cap the number 
of allowances, creating a market for carbon allowances.125 Those emit-
ting under their allotment may sell their surplus allowances, and emit-
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ters emitting beyond their allotment may purchase excess allowances.126 
The EC employed a phased implementation of the scheme to allow for 
periodic review of system strengths and weaknesses.127 Phase I began on 
January 1, 2005, and is limited to CO2 emissions from industrial instal-
lations in the energy, metal production, mineral, and paper industries, 
which account for approximately forty-five percent of EU CO2 emis-
sions.128 Successive phases will expand the scheme to cover more 
greenhouse gases and industries while progressively tightening emis-
sions caps.129 Phase II is set to coincide with the first Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period, from 2008 to 2012.130 
 EU member-states construct National Allocation Plans to distribute 
emissions credits to units covered by the ETS.131 The EC then reviews 
the allocation plans made by member-states.132 During Phase I, the EC 
required that each state’s allocation plan moved it toward its Kyoto 
commitment.133 In Phase II, the EC will require that each state’s alloca-
tion plan strictly complies with its Kyoto Protocol obligations.134 
B. The Proposed Directive Itself 
1. Mechanics of the Proposed Directive 
 The EC announced that the Proposed Directive would include 
aviation within the ETS on December 20, 2006.135 The Proposed Direc-
tive would amend the existing EC directive by establishing that aviation 
would be a covered industry under the ETS.136 Flights between EU air-
ports will be included within the ETS by 2011.137 The ETS will extend to 
all flights arriving at EU airports from outside the region or departing 
from EU airports headed outside the region by 2012.138 In the interests 
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of brevity and clarity, the latter group of flights will be referred to as 
“international” for the remainder of this Note.139 
 The Proposed Directive establishes individual airlines as the points 
of regulation.140 Allowance allocation will occur at the EU-level, unlike 
the current ETS where allocation occurs at the member-state-level.141 
The EC will determine the total number of allowances to be distributed 
by average aviation emissions data from 2004 to 2006.142 For aviation 
operators licensed in the EU, the Proposed Directive assigns monitor-
ing and compliance responsibilities to the EU member-state in which 
each airline is licensed.143 For non-EU aviation operators, the regula-
tion assigns these responsibilities to the EU member-state in which each 
airline emits the largest quantity of CO2.144 The Proposed Directive 
would integrate the airlines into the prior-existing ETS market so that 
the airlines could buy and sell allowances across industries.145 
2. Rationale for Including Aviation in the ETS 
 Neither domestic nor international aviation emissions are cur-
rently included in the ETS.146 While the Kyoto Protocol includes do-
mestic aviation greenhouse gas emissions within the reduction targets 
for developed countries, it delegates responsibility to the ICAO to 
guide efforts to achieve international aviation emissions reductions.147 
While the inclusion of domestic aviation into the ETS for member-
states is a partial solution to the emissions problem, the EC posits that 
any meaningful emissions reduction measures must also include inter-
national aviation because it accounts for the vast majority of EU 
flights.148 While aviation accounts for only 3% of EU greenhouse gas 
emissions, the EC projects that by 2012, emissions from international 
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flights would increase by 150% from 1990 levels.149 Growth at this rate 
would offset greater than 25% of EU Kyoto Protocol reductions.150 The 
EC acknowledges the role that the Kyoto Protocol assigned to the ICAO 
in working toward international aviation emissions.151 EU member-
states continue to cooperate with ongoing ICAO work on such emis-
sions.152 The Commission has concluded, however, that comprehensive 
action in a new direction is required to effectively achieve international 
aviation emissions reductions.153 
 The EC anticipates that bringing aviation within the ETS will ex-
ert sufficient pressure on the industry to mitigate its adverse envi-
ronmental impact.154 Supporters of the regulation project that it will 
provide enhanced incentive for airlines to invest in developing more 
efficient technology.155 In turn, the inclusion of aviation in the ETS 
will strengthen the carbon market, as air service providers will be able 
to buy and sell emissions allowances across industries.156 
III. Political, Technical, and Legal Implications of the 
Proposed Directive 
 The Proposed Directive’s inclusion of international aviation in the 
ETS raises political, technical, and legal issues associated with the regu-
lation.157 While a variety of interests throughout the world have shown 
strong support for the regulation, aviation interests outside of the EU, 
particularly in the United States, have objected to the planned inclu-
sion of international aviation.158 Fundamentally, critics of the regula-
tion are concerned that it amounts to unilateral action directed at a 
global problem which requires, for a number of reasons, a multilateral 
solution.159 This concern informs political, technical, and legal cri-
tiques of the Proposed Directive.160 
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A. Political Implications 
 The primary political issue at stake is the identity of the appropri-
ate regulatory body entrusted to pursue emissions mitigation measures 
in international aviation.161 Airlines, trade groups, and governments 
outside of the EU are skeptical as to whether the EC is the appropriate 
body to pursue emissions reductions in international aviation.162 They 
argue that the climate change effects of international aviation emis-
sions present a global problem requiring a global solution.163 Accord-
ingly, these proponents advocate that the ICAO and the existing inter-
national aviation regulatory framework is the appropriate forum in 
which to pursue international aviation emissions reductions.164 
 Further, non-EU aviation representatives argue that the Proposed 
Directive inappropriately would force the EU’s preferred brand of cli-
mate change policy on other regions of the world.165 These interests 
argue that the Proposed Directive ignores the fact that countries’ indi-
vidual political and economic climates determine the shape of effective 
regulation.166 Developing countries, in particular, have argued that ex-
tension of the ETS to international aviation interferes with their pursuit 
of a number of other emissions reduction measures that are more 
suited to their regulatory agendas.167 
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B. Technical Implications 
 The technical design of the Proposed Directive’s inclusion of in-
ternational aviation in the ETS raises concerns among opponents of 
the regulation.168 Design concerns include criticism of the choice of 
regulatory instrument, emissions credit allocation, compliance and en-
forcement measures, and system coverage.169 These concerns are dis-
cussed briefly below as they relate to the political and legal issues dis-
cussed herein.170 
 Critics of the Proposed Directive’s inclusion of international avia-
tion in the ETS have questioned the selection of emissions trading to 
pursue international aviation emissions reductions.171 U.S. aviation 
representatives believe that the international aviation industry first 
should pursue an overhaul of the air traffic management (ATM) sys-
tem to realize emissions reductions more quickly and at a lower 
cost.172 Under this approach, ATM directors might achieve emissions 
reductions by changing taxiing and flight patterns of aircraft in inter-
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national aviation.173 These interests argue that extension of the ETS to 
international aviation discourages governments from improving ATM 
efficiency.174 Critics of the Proposed Directive also have argued that 
emissions trading will not provide the incentive to improve fuel effi-
ciency anticipated by the EC.175 They contend that a number of con-
cerns, including weak economies and security issues, have forced in-
ternational aviation to become a highly efficient industry that closely 
accounts for all costs, especially those attributable to fuel.176 
 Related to trading, the emissions credit allocation used in the Pro-
posed Directive has raised concerns.177 The Proposed Directive con-
templates initially auctioning a small amount of emissions credits and 
distributing the majority of emissions credits to air service providers at 
no cost calculated by prior emissions.178 Critics of the regulation have 
argued that airlines that receive free emissions credits may pass the cost 
directly to consumers and thus realize windfall profits.179 According to 
these critics, this windfall would undercut the credibility of emissions 
trading as a serious climate change harm-mitigation measure.180 Avia-
tion representatives also have expressed concern that the lack of a 
committed number of emissions credits set aside for startup airlines 
would hinder entrance to the market while favoring incumbent air-
lines.181 
 The monitoring and compliance scheme for non-EU carriers 
might also raise concerns.182 The Proposed Directive assigns monitor-
ing and compliance responsibilities for non-EU airlines to the EU 
member-state in which each airline emits the largest quantity of CO2.183 
Accordingly, under this scheme an administering state would be re-
sponsible for ensuring compliance with the ETS for its own airlines and 
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presumably their biggest international competitors.184 Non-EU aviation 
interests might criticize this arrangement, questioning its inherent fair-
ness while noting the administering state’s temptation to engage in 
protectionist enforcement to the detriment of non-EU operators.185 
 Commentators in and outside of the EU have criticized the scope 
of coverage of the Proposed Directive, fearing market distortions.186 
Representatives of EU aviation interests have expressed concern that 
the Proposed Directive, even after the inclusion of international 
flights, will place an increased burden on airlines operating in the EU 
to the benefit of carriers outside of the EU.187 Air service providers 
have warned that they may consider rerouting their services to elude 
the reach of the ETS.188 In the EU, the German carrier Lufthansa has 
threatened to relocate to Zurich, Switzerland—a non-EU state—to 
sidestep the ETS if the Proposed Directive takes effect.189 Non-EU op-
erators, such as Asian carriers, may use hubs in other regions for 
flights that previously would have gone through the EU.190 
C. Legal Implications 
 Concern about the political and technical implications of the Pro-
posed Directive’s inclusion of international aviation in the ETS informs 
legal critiques of the regulation.191 EU aviation representatives argue 
that the Proposed Directive is within the EC’s authority under the exist-
ing international aviation regulatory framework.192 EU proponents of 
the Proposed Directive liken the extension of the ETS to international 
aviation to admission and departure requirements permitted under the 
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Chicago Convention and ASAs.193 Article 1 of the Chicago Convention 
provides that each signatory state has exclusive sovereignty over the air-
space above its territory.194 Article 6 provides that no scheduled air ser-
vice may occur above each signatory state without prior authorization, 
according to the terms of the signatory state.195 Under Article 11, signa-
tory states may apply admission and departure requirements to aircraft 
in international aviation entering or leaving the state so long as they are 
applied without distinction as to nationality and conform with the pro-
visions of the Chicago Convention.196 EU aviation representatives argue 
that, taken together, these provisions support the route-based extension 
of the ETS to international aviation according to either the point of 
departure or arrival.197 
 EU aviation representatives further argue that extending the ETS 
to international aviation accords with the Chicago Convention and 
ICAO guidance on emissions-mitigation measures.198 The Kyoto Proto-
col requires that signatory states, including all EU member-states, pur-
sue international aviation emissions reductions through the ICAO.199 
The EC notes that the ICAO CAEP, at its September 2004 meeting, de-
clined to issue a legal instrument to coordinate emissions trading 
through ICAO.200 ICAO Assembly Resolution 35-5, issued in October, 
2004, in part, endorses an open emissions trading system for interna-
tional aviation and contemplates either an ICAO-supported voluntary 
trading system or the extension of ICAO member-states’ trading sys-
tems to international aviation.201 Proponents of the Proposed Directive 
read this guidance as endorsing the extension of the ETS to interna-
tional aviation.202 While the majority of ICAO member-states agreed at 
the ICAO Assembly’s September 2007 meeting that member-states 
should not apply an emissions trading system to other states’ aircraft 
operators except on the basis of mutual agreement, the EU states en-
tered a formal reservation, arguing that no provision in the Chicago 
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Convention required a state to seek mutual consent prior to applica-
tion of market-based measures.203 
 Opponents of the Proposed Directive, however, may scrutinize the 
regulation under the Chicago Convention, ASAs, and general princi-
ples of international law.204 These detractors might argue that that Pro-
posed Directive amounts to an impermissible operating requirement, 
tax, or charge, or, alternatively, that the EC lacks jurisdiction to pre-
scribe emissions regulation to operators in international aviation.205 
1. Impermissible Operating Requirement Argument 
 Opponents of the Proposed Directive may argue that the regula-
tion would impermissibly regulate aircraft operation in contravention 
of the Chicago Convention or ASAs.206 Article 12 of the Chicago Con-
vention requires that aircraft of each signatory state comply with the 
rules relating to “flight and maneuver” of the states in which they are 
operating.207 Article 12 further provides, “Over the high seas, the 
rules in force shall be those established under this Convention.”208 
Article 11 of the U.S. Model Open Skies Agreement provides: 
[N]either Party shall unilaterally limit the volume of traffic, 
frequency or regularity of service, or the aircraft type or types 
operated by the designated airlines of the other Party, except 
as may be required for customs, technical, operational, or en-
vironmental reasons under uniform conditions consistent 
with Article 15 of the Convention.209 
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In light of these provisions, opponents of the Proposed Directive 
might argue that it violates Article 12 of the Chicago Convention be-
cause it would impose operating requirements on aircraft in interna-
tional aviation over the high seas.210 Alternatively, they might argue 
that the regulation would violate the above provisions of ASAs prohib-
iting the unilateral imposition of operating requirements on aircraft 
in international aviation.211 
 The critical issue under such challenges would be whether the 
Proposed Directive’s inclusion of international aviation in the ETS 
amounts to aircraft operation regulation.212 EU aviation representatives 
contend that including international aviation in the ETS would only 
impose admission and departure requirements permissible under the 
Chicago Convention and ASAs;213 they argue that any change in aircraft 
operation would result from a conscious business decision by the avia-
tion provider.214 Skeptics of the regulation also might assert that the EC 
fundamentally intended the Proposed Directive to affect aircraft opera-
tion.215 A cap-and-trade emissions system operates on the regulated en-
tities by creating incentives and consequences for engaging in a regu-
lated activity.216 For instance, in contemplating the effect of extending 
the ETS to developing countries that’s airlines may have older, less effi-
cient aircraft, the EC noted that such airlines could consider using their 
most efficient planes to serve the EU to lessen the impact of the ETS.217 
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designed to suppress aviation (by increasing its costs, to serve a greater global 
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choice of equipment can be considered to intend that result. 
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Opponents of the Proposed Directive might argue that this demon-
strates a clear intent to impose operation regulation on aircraft in viola-
tion of either Article 12 of the Chicago Convention or ASAs.218 It is rea-
sonable to expect that the effect of the ETS on aircraft operation would 
become more dramatic as successive phases of the ETS featured more 
stringent emissions standards, as contemplated by the EC.219 
 Further, the nature of the regulated activity, CO2 emission, may 
suggest that the EC proposal would impermissibly regulate aircraft op-
eration over the high seas.220 After 2012, the ETS would cover, for ex-
ample, an American flight departing New York bound for Paris.221 The 
majority of the regulated activity would occur outside of the EU, over 
the high seas. Accordingly, critics of the regulation may argue that it 
impermissibly amounts to another layer of operation regulation in an 
area in which the Chicago Convention has reserved rulemaking au-
thority to itself.222 
2. Impermissible Charge or Tax Argument 
 Non-EU aviation interests might challenge the Proposed Direc-
tive’s inclusion of international aviation in the ETS as an impermissible 
charge or tax under the Chicago Convention or ASAs.223 Article 15 of 
the Chicago Convention allows aviation facilities and services providers 
to assess charges to recover their costs.224 Subsequent ICAO guidance 
elaborates on Article 15 and suggests that charges should not exceed 
the identifiable costs of facilities or services provided.225 Article 10 of 
the U.S. Model Open Skies Agreement echoes the close correlation 
between user charges and actual costs incurred by facilities and services 
providers, and requires that charges be related to costs makes this cor-
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relation mandatory.226 Article 15 of the Chicago Convention also pro-
hibits the imposition of a charge based solely on a right of transit, exit, 
or entry.227 
 Mindful of these provisions, opponents of the Proposed Directive 
might argue that extension of the ETS to international aviation im-
poses an impermissible charge that exceeds any identifiable cost under 
Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, elaborated upon by subsequent 
nonbinding guidance, or ASAs.228 Alternatively, critics might argue that 
the ETS amounts to an impermissible charge based solely on the right 
of entry or exit under Article 15 of the Chicago Convention.229 
 Non-EU aviation interests may also claim that the extension of the 
ETS to international aviation amounts to an impermissible tax under 
the Chicago Convention or ASAs.230 Article 24 exempts fuel arriving on 
board from a “customs duty” and other charges.231 Subsequent ICAO 
guidance on taxation suggests that this exemption extends to “import, 
export, excise, sales, consumption and internal duties and taxes of all 
kinds levied upon the fuel.”232 Further, Article 9 of the U.S. Model 
Open Skies Agreement contains a reciprocal exemption from national 
taxes on fuel on aircraft in international aviation.233 Accordingly, oppo-
nents of the Proposed Directive might argue that extension of the ETS 
to international aviation would amount to an impermissible tax on fuel 
in international aviation under the Chicago Convention or ASAs be-
cause it would effectively impose a cost on aviation operators as a func-
tion of fuel consumption.234 
 The plausibility of these challenges would turn on whether the 
ETS could be distinguished from a charge or tax. EU aviation represen-
tatives argue that emissions trading is contemplated by neither the Chi-
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cago Convention nor ASAs and that it is distinct from a charge or 
tax.235 Non-EU aviation interests would likely rebut that the extension 
of the ETS to international aviation would amount to a charge or tax 
because it would unilaterally impose costs on aviation operators.236 
3. Jurisdiction to Prescribe Argument 
 Apart from the existing international aviation regulatory frame-
work, opponents of the Proposed Directive may challenge whether the 
EC or EU member-states have jurisdiction to prescribe CO2 emissions 
regulation extraterritorially.237 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States (Restatement) reflects modern international law’s 
treatment of a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe extraterritorial regula-
tion.238 Section 402(1)(c) of the Restatement provides that a state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to “conduct outside its terri-
tory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its terri-
tory.”239 Section 403(1) provides, “Even when one of the bases of juris-
diction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections 
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreason-
able.”240 Section 403(2) elaborates on the factors used to determine 
whether exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable, including: 
 (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating 
state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within 
the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect 
upon or in the territory; 
 (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or eco-
nomic activity, between the regulating state and the person 
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or be-
tween that state and those whom the regulation is designed to 
protect; 
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 (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the impor-
tance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which 
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which 
the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; 
 (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be 
protected or hurt by the regulation; 
 (e) the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system; 
 (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the 
traditions of the international system; 
 (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest 
in regulating the activity; and 
 (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another 
state.241 
 Opponents of the extension of the ETS to international aviation 
might argue that the EC lacks jurisdiction to prescribe CO2 regulation 
extraterritorially because such regulation would be unsupported by a 
substantial effect in EU territory.242 Critics of the regulation might argue 
that non-EU carriers, serving the EU, engaged in international aviation 
primarily over the high seas and foreign countries do not produce a 
substantial effect in EU territory.243 Further, they might argue that avia-
tion emissions, accounting for two percent of global CO2 emissions, do 
not produce a substantial effect on the long-term impacts of climate 
change, the ultimate regulatory aim of the Proposed Directive.244 
 Non-EU aviation interests would likely argue that even if the EC 
and EU member-states could show that international aviation emis-
sions produced a substantial effect in the EU, it should refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction because doing so would be unreasonable.245 In 
light of sections 403(2)(a) and (c) of the Restatement, critics of the 
regulation might scrutinize the connection between the regulated 
activity and the regulating entity.246 They might argue that in extend-
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ing the ETS to international aviation, the EC would attempt to regu-
late an activity—CO2 emission—that occurs largely in international 
territory and that yields a global rather than localized effect.247 Under 
section 403(2)(e), opponents might argue that the importance of in-
ternational aviation to the world economy and its service of a critical, 
unique need counsel against unilateral, regional implementation of 
regulation that would drastically affect international aviation.248 Un-
der section 403(f), critics might find that the Proposed Directive 
would be a radical departure from the traditions of international avia-
tion regulation.249 Lastly, opponents might argue that according to 
sections 403(g) and (h) the Proposed Directive’s extension of the ETS 
to international aviation would be at odds with the efforts of the 
ICAO and its member-states in regulating aviation emissions.250 
 States’ jurisdiction to prescribe extraterritorial regulation aimed at 
activities that affect climate change remains an open question.251 EU 
aviation interests would likely dispute whether the extension of the ETS 
to international aviation amounts to an extraterritorial application of 
EU law; rather, as noted above, they would likely argue that the Pro-
posed Directive only imposes admission and departure requirements 
on aviation operators serving the EU.252 Notwithstanding this objection, 
if the Proposed Directive were recast as extraterritorially prescribing 
emissions regulation, EU aviation interests might argue that interna-
tional aviation indeed produces a substantial effect within the EU, pro-
viding the basis for reasonable extraterritorial jurisdiction.253 
D. Potential Dispute Resolution Pathways 
 Opponents of the regulation may attempt to forestall implementa-
tion of the Proposed Directive through diplomatic channels, adjudica-
tion before the ICAO, dispute resolution under ASAs, or challenges in 
national courts.254 Supporters and opponents of the Proposed Directive 
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will continue to evaluate the merits of each of these pathways while the 
European Parliament and Council consider the regulation in the code-
cision process.255 
 Opponents of the Proposed Directive will continue to employ dip-
lomatic efforts to prevent the extension of the ETS to international 
aviation.256 Aviation representatives in the U.S. government have stated 
that they will continue to work with their EU counterparts to ensure 
that the ETS is not extended to international aviation.257 Non-EU avia-
tion representatives critical of the regulation continue to coordinate 
their resistance to the Proposed Directive.258 The ICAO provides a fo-
rum for diplomatic contact between supporters and critics of the regu-
lation. 
 Opponents of the Proposed Directive might also seek redress un-
der the provisions of ASAs.259 As discussed above, non-EU critics of the 
regulation might find that the proposed extension of the ETS to inter-
national aviation would contravene provisions of ASAs.260 Accordingly, 
these interests, whether airlines or government officials, might lobby 
the aggrieved state party to the agreement to initiate consultations, as 
provided by the ASA, with an EU member-state regarding interpreta-
tion of the agreement.261 If consultations fail to yield an understanding 
acceptable to both parties, either party may then refer the dispute to 
arbitration as provided by the ASA.262 Alternatively, opponents of the 
Proposed Directive’s extension of the ETS to international aviation 
might press a state party to consider retaliatory economic measures 
under the ASA.263 
 Non-EU ICAO member-states may also challenge the Proposed 
Directive’s extension of the ETS to international aviation pursuant to 
Article 84 of the Chicago Convention.264 Comparing the opposition to 
the Proposed Directive to the Hushkit Dispute may offer insight into 
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the nature of a potential challenge to the regulation in front of the 
ICAO Council.265 In the Hushkit Dispute, large financial stakes coupled 
with political and technical concerns informed and motivated a U.S. 
challenge under Article 84 against EU member-states to the implemen-
tation of environmental regulation.266 U.S. aviation representatives have 
noted that implementation of the Proposed Directive may prompt a 
similar U.S. response before the ICAO Council to block the extension 
of the ETS to international aviation.267 Further, where the Hushkit Dis-
pute primarily concerned the United States and EU member-states, the 
Proposed Directive appears to have elicited broader international op-
position to the regulation.268 
 The ICAO Council’s acceptance of the Hushkit Dispute marked an 
expansion of the Council’s exercise of jurisdiction into economic and 
environmental disputes.269 It is reasonable to expect that the Council 
might continue to exert itself in these areas affecting international avia-
tion and entertain challenges to the Proposed Directive.270 The resolu-
tion of the Hushkit Dispute through assisted negotiation was consistent 
with the Council’s demonstrated preference to settle disputes short of 
formal adjudication, but it left as an open question the relation be-
tween ICAO member-state environmental regulation and the Conven-
tion and ICAO standards.271 If implemented, the Proposed Directive 
may afford the Council another opportunity to provide guidance on 
this matter.272 Any future reconsideration of this question would de-
pend, however, on how the developing ICAO guidance on emissions 
trading in international aviation would relate to the EU regulation.273 
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IV. Pursuing International Aviation Emissions Reduction 
Measures Through the ICAO 
 The Proposed Directive embodies a progressive and timely regula-
tory intent to apply a novel regulatory mechanism to a specific manifes-
tation of the climate change effects of a commercial activity, a problem 
that increasingly attracts global attention.274 Non-EU political, techni-
cal, and legal opposition to the Proposed Directive largely flows from 
the idea that extension of the ETS to international aviation amounts to 
an ill-advised and possibly impermissible unilateral action directed to-
ward a global problem that requires a multilateral solution.275 Even in 
light of this critique, it is important to note that where multilateral ac-
tion is desirable to address a global environmental problem, unilateral 
action often, in fact, provides the impetus that ultimately spurs global 
action.276 The Proposed Directive is motivated in part by a reasonable 
impatience among EU member-states with the pace of the development 
of multilateral international aviation emissions reduction measures.277 
However, the formidable multidisciplinary concerns raised by the regu-
lation counsel against extension of the ETS to international aviation.278 
To preserve the regulatory momentum at the heart of the Proposed 
Directive and insulate it from likely protracted legal challenges, the EC 
should not include international aviation in the ETS; rather, interna-
tional aviation emissions reductions should be aggressively pursued 
through the ICAO because it is responsive to the political, technical, 
and legal implications raised by the regulation.279 
 The ICAO is the politically appropriate body to direct develop-
ment of international aviation emissions reduction measures. The Chi-
cago Convention charges the ICAO with the task of achieving uniform-
ity in international aviation regulation.280 The ICAO has expanded its 
role in environmental regulation from setting technical standards to 
contemplating complex, market-based measures that exist at the inter-
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face of economic, technical, and international policy.281 Accordingly, 
the ICAO is the appropriate venue to work towards uniformity among 
member-states in such a complex regulatory arena.282 Further, as nearly 
all countries with international aviation operators are members of the 
ICAO, developing emissions reduction measures through the ICAO 
would increase participation from all primary international aviation 
stakeholders.283 ICAO-developed guidance should reduce the disen-
franchisement and resentment that might follow from unilateral re-
gional action with far-reaching effects, lessening the risk of noncompli-
ance and retaliatory regulation that may otherwise follow.284 
 The ICAO is best positioned to guide the technical design of an 
international aviation emissions reduction regime.285 As its regulatory 
role has expanded, the ICAO has developed unmatched multidiscipli-
nary expertise through the solicitation of expert input in a number of 
fields affecting international aviation policy, including economics, en-
gineering, and environmental science.286 This expertise should lend 
itself to full consideration of the technical issues related to the design 
of an international aviation emissions reduction regime and increase 
stakeholder confidence in the resultant system.287 Aviation representa-
tives have criticized the impact assessment commissioned by the EC and 
relied upon in the Proposed Directive.288 EU aviation interests have ar-
gued that the study did not adequately account for the economic ef-
fects of extending the ETS to aviation.289 Non-EU interests have argued 
that the study gave insufficient consideration to the impacts of extend-
ing the ETS to international aviation felt outside of the EU.290 With its 
geographically diverse membership, the ICAO is well suited to take into 
account the economic, political, and technical circumstances of its 
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member-states in emissions reduction system design.291 This robust 
consideration of a variety of regulatory philosophies and mechanisms 
should address the equity concerns raised by member-states in develop-
ing regions.292 Lastly, development of an international aviation emis-
sions reductions program through the ICAO may avoid the regulatory 
and market distortions that would likely follow from enactment of the 
Proposed Directive.293 Achieving a broader geographic coverage in an 
emissions reduction regime, even if it were to mean settling on less am-
bitious emissions standards, could result in a more effective system that 
avoids regional balkanization of regulation and market distortions.294 
 Pursuing an international aviation emissions reduction regime 
through the ICAO could avoid legal challenges that appear likely if the 
Proposed Directive continues on its current path toward enactment.295 
The fundamental tension underlying much of the opposition to the 
Proposed Directive—that it is an ill-advised unilateral action aimed at a 
global problem with dramatic effects felt abroad—incentivizes potential 
opponents of the regulation to interpret questionable provisions of 
relevant law as presenting legal obstacles to the extension of the ETS to 
international aviation.296 Non-EU aviation interests have indicated that 
legal action is likely if the regulation proceeds toward enactment.297 As 
a result, the legal status of the Proposed Directive under the existing 
international aviation regulatory framework and international law is 
uncertain until these legal disputes are either averted or resolved.298 
Developing an international aviation emissions reduction system 
through the ICAO would allow adverse parties to work toward a com-
mon understanding of the meaning of contested provisions of the rele-
vant law as they relate to aviation emissions reduction measures.299 
 Skeptics of pursuing international aviation emissions reductions 
through the ICAO may argue that the ICAO has failed to act quickly 
enough.300 They might fear that aviation interests have used the ICAO 
                                                                                                                      
291 See Miller, supra note 29, at 728–29. 
292 See id. 
293 See id. at 726. 
294 Jennison, supra note 215. 
295 See Turner, USA Ready to Fight, supra note 190, at 8. 
296 See Jennison, supra note 215. 
297 See Turner, USA Ready to Fight, supra note 190, at 8. 
298 See id. 
299 See Jennison, supra note 215. 
300 See EC Communication on Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation, supra note 13, at 
5. 
2008] International Aviation Emissions Trading for the EU? 383 
to delay implementation of CO2 emissions standards.301 To be sure, the 
ICAO has contemplated emissions reduction measures for a number of 
years and has yet to issue emissions guidance that would achieve the 
reductions contemplated by the Proposed Directive.302 However, the 
ICAO has worked diligently during this time through cooperation with 
member-state governments, multinational organizations, and in its own 
committees and working groups to develop the capability to account 
for the myriad concerns implicated in pursuing emissions reduc-
tions.303 The EU could provide a needed spur to the development of 
ICAO emissions guidance by extending the ETS to aviation in the EU 
among its member-states, as contemplated by the first phase of the 
Proposed Directive, and bringing concrete evidence of the implemen-
tation of emissions trading in aviation to bear on the ICAO process.304 
 The ETS in general, and the Proposed Directive in particular, 
demonstrates that the EU is out in the forefront in pursuing CO2 emis-
sions reductions.305 Rather than jeopardize the regulatory momentum 
underlying the Proposed Directive, the EU should instead channel this 
inertia into holding the ICAO accountable for fulfilling the environ-
mental duties it has assumed through rigorous pursuit of an interna-
tional aviation emissions regime. The recent ICAO CAEP meeting, Col-
loquium, and Assembly meeting show that emissions reduction 
measures—particularly emissions trading—figure prominently in the 
regulatory consciousness of the ICAO and its member-states.306 Seizing 
upon this consciousness, and mindful of the ambitiousness of the Pro-
posed Directive, the EU would stand poised to capitalize on a prime 
opportunity to ensure the institutional integrity and responsibility of 
the ICAO. 
Conclusion 
 The international civil aviation regulatory framework, comprised 
of the Chicago Convention, ICAO, and bilateral air service agreements, 
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reaches nearly all matters related to international aviation. Reflecting 
increasing global concern over environmental quality, the ICAO has 
expanded the ambit of its regulatory activities from providing guidance 
on technical matters and airspace rights to include the contemplation 
of complex international environmental regulation. 
 The EC’s Proposed Directive would extend the ETS to civil avia-
tion, first to airlines operating in the EU, and then to all international 
aviation operators serving the EU. The regulation would subject all air-
lines operating in the EU to CO2 emissions caps and participation in 
the EU carbon market. EU representatives have argued that the Pro-
posed Directive is congruent with international aviation emissions re-
duction efforts and is a consistent and necessary next step toward 
achieving meaningful emissions reductions. 
 Non-EU aviation interests have raised significant political, technical, 
and legal critiques of the Proposed Directive’s inclusion of international 
aviation in the ETS. Opposition to the regulation principally flows from 
the perception that the EU is acting unilaterally to address a global prob-
lem. Critics have questioned whether the EC is the politically appropriate 
regulatory body to ensure maximum efficiency and compliance. They 
have also questioned several technical design aspects of the regulation’s 
inclusion of international aviation in the ETS, including choice of regu-
latory instrument, emissions credit allocation, compliance and enforce-
ment measures, and system coverage. These political and technical con-
cerns may inform legal challenges under the Chicago Convention, 
bilateral air service agreements, or general provisions of international 
law to block the implementation of the Proposed Directive. 
 To preserve the regulatory inertia at the center of the Proposed 
Directive and avoid undue legal challenges, the EC should not include 
international aviation in the ETS, but should instead rigorously pursue 
international aviation emissions reductions through the ICAO. The 
ICAO is responsive to the political, technical, and legal issues raised by 
the Proposed Directive and is the appropriate forum for international 
aviation stakeholders to discern the characteristics of an appropriate 
and effective international aviation emissions reductions regime. EU 
interests might be reasonably impatient with the pace of emission re-
ductions measures in the ICAO to date. However, these interests should 
channel their efforts toward holding the ICAO to the environmental 
responsibilities it has voluntarily accepted rather than fending off likely 
challenges that would result from unilateral action. 
